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Abstract—A payment system in a disaster area is essential
for people to buy necessities such as groceries, clothing, and
medical supplies. However, existing payment systems require the
needed communication infrastructures (like wired networks and
cellular networks) to enable transactions, so that these systems
cannot be relied on in disaster areas, where these communication
infrastructures may be destroyed. In this paper, we propose a
mobile payment system, adopting infrastructureless mobile ad-
hoc networks (MANETs), which allow users to shop in disaster
areas while providing secure transactions. Specifically, we propose
an endorsement-based scheme to guarantee each transaction and
a scheme to provide monitoring based on location information,
and thus achieve transaction validity and reliability. Our mobile
payment system can also prevent collusion between two parties
and reset and recover attacks by any user. Security is ensured by
using location-based mutual monitoring by nearby users, avoiding
thereby double spending in the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major problem in disaster areas is that people there do
not have cash on hand to pay for such necessities as groceries,
clothing and medical supplies. Moreover, due to the lack of
communication infrastructures (like wired networks and cellu-
lar networks) in disaster areas, people cannot access their bank
accounts to make electronic financial transactions. Therefore,
an infrastructureless payment system which functions well
without the support of communication infrastructures is vital
for people in disaster areas.
To enable carrying out offline financial transactions in
disaster areas that lack communication infrastructures, we
need an infrastructureless mobile ad-hoc network to be able
to design a mobile payment system. Although the proposed
system can also work online (e.g. as a digital currency),
requesting electronic money from a bank for immediate use
is not possible when there is no direct connection to the bank.
There are many payment systems providing digital currency
services, but none of them have been developed to address
the needs of people in a disaster situation where there is no
communication infrastructure. This paper therefore focuses on
offline transaction over a mobile ad-hoc network. In designing
such a system, however, we face the following challenges [1].
 Unreliability of wireless link between nodes : A mobile
ad-hoc network is characterized by its limited energy, which
makes it difficult to maintain a consistent wireless link for
communication.
 Constantly changing topology : Topology changes very
rapidly in a mobile ad-hoc network due to movement of nodes
into and out of the network. This also results in a decrease
in performance, due to a difficulty in routing data to its
destination.
 Lack of incorporation of security features : Security
features in statically configured wireless networks are not
available for ad-hoc environments, which increases exposure
and vulnerability to attacks.
In this paper, we propose an endorsement-based mobile
payment system to address these issues. Specifically, each
customer in the network will select people to endorse their
transactions, where the digital signature of an endorser is
obtained on every transaction as proof of the endorsement. This
will ensure that the merchant gets paid after each successful
transaction. Thus, in the case where a customer buys an
item and does not pay, the money can be deducted from the
endorser’s account. Since there is no direct connection with
the payment source (bank) and it is therefore not possible
to achieve transaction validity and reliability, we introduce
monitoring based on location information. This will not only
make a transaction valid and reliable, but also prevent reuse
of transaction data to carry out attacks in the network. To
prevent impersonation and fraud, a digitally signed photograph
is introduced to identify users. Our payment system could also
prevent cases of collusion and double spending. Furthermore,
user privacy protection is secured by ensuring that the user
nickname (e.g. a Temporary ID) is used in every transaction.
The nickname can be scrambled, and this will give a customer
a different nickname per transaction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we review related literature on mobile payment systems. In
Section III, we present the overview of the proposed mobile
payment system, and in Section IV we propose schemes to
provide secure transactions. Finally, we give in Section V an
evaluation of the proposed system and conclude the whole
paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we outline existing mobile payment sys-
tems. Although many works have been conducted on payment
systems, most of these studies require the help of infrastruc-
tures (online services) to enable secure transactions in the pay-
ment system, and are therefore not suitable for disaster areas.
For example, Hu et al. [2] designed an online authentication
system (called Anonymous Micropayments Authentication) to
allow a customer and a merchant to authenticate each other
indirectly, while preventing a merchant from knowing the
customer’s real identity. Their proposed system also introduces
a payment mechanism where a customer sends an order
and payment authorization to the merchant to buy an item.
The protocol ensures that the computational overhead of the
customer’s mobile phone is minimized. However, the payment
protocol is not optimized for subsequent payments by the
customer to the same merchant, and the protocol depends on
a trusted third party, which is a performance bottleneck in the
system.
Wang et al. [3] presented a novel e-cash payment system
which reduces the online computational cost of transactions.
When payment is required during the transaction, the customer
uses an electronic payment certificate issued by a bank to
request payment from the bank. The money is deducted
directly from customers account after the merchant supplies
the item. Other research focuses on e-payment systems such
as electronic cash [4], electronic checks [5], electronic travelers
checks [6]. By using oriented architecture in wireless networks,
Kiran et al. [7] proposed a robust payment system which
adopts a public key infrastructure and a hash chain to secure
transactions. Different from online payment systems, Dai et
al. [8] recently developed an offline payment system, which,
however, is only for digital goods. Li et al. [9] introduces a
similar concept, but uses a different approach. Li’s electronic
payment protocol allows a vehicle to pay for a transaction
in a restricted connectivity scenario, but it requires a wire-
less connection between the merchant and the bank during
transaction. This protocol uses the prepaid method of payment.
Dahlberg et al. [10] review various existing mobile payment
systems and propose frameworks for analyzing the mobile
payment research. In addition, regarding various grey areas,
they recommend solutions on which future mobile payment
research should be based.
Nakamoto [11] also proposed a decentralized electronic
cash system known as Bitcoin, which requires no central
control. New transactions are broadcasted to all nodes in the
system, and each node accepts the transaction into a block.
Then the nodes try to do a reverse calculation of a hash
function, which takes a larger amount of computation, as
proof-of-work to validate the transaction for its block. (The
validation process is called mining and each miner is rewarded
for every block validated). Nodes accept the block only if the
transactions are valid and not already spent. The hash of an
accepted block is used as the previous hash in the next block
to form a block chain, and the network can thereby agree on
the order in which the transaction occurred. Bitcoin, however,
requires a CPU device with a high power and transactions
which are computationally irreversible, so that coins whose
private key has been forgotten or destroyed can never be
replaced.
Our contribution in this paper is the introduction of a secure
payment system that adopts infrastructureless mobile ad-hoc
networks (MANETs) to allow users to purchase necessities in
disaster areas. Also, we propose a mechanism that ensures that
double spending is detected before a transaction is completed
and instead of when the e-coin is deposited in the bank or
deducted from the customer’s account. Our proposed system
adopts an approach similar to that of Bitcoin by ensuring that
transactions are broadcast to neighboring nodes. The proposed
system, however, differs in techniques, since users do not need
proof of work. Rather, users compute the hash value of a
transaction log, and neighboring nodes append their signature
to the log to form an event chain (similar to block chain).
The event chain can be verified by surrounding neighboring
nodes. Unlike most existing payment systems, our proposed
mechanism does not depend on a central authority or mint to
detect double spending.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we first introduce the transaction procedures
of our payment system in areas of no disaster, and then we
explain our endorsement-based mobile payment system for
disaster areas.
A. Participants
The parties (customer, endorser, merchant, and bank) in-
volved in a payment system will be referred to as users.
Fig. 1. Users in a payment system.
 Merchant - a user that provides goods, services, products or
software.
 Customer - a user that buys goods, services, products or
software from a merchant.
 Endorser - a user who pledges to fulfill the customer’s
obligation should the customer fail to pay for items bought.
 Monitoring Customer (referred to as a Monitor hereafter)
- a customer that checks every transaction within the radio
range to make sure that each is valid and reliable.
 Bank - an organization that maintains users’ accounts.
B. Payment System in Areas without Disaster
In areas without disasters, there is a direct communication
connection to the payment source (e.g., a bank) through
communication infrastructures.
The procedure to buy an item in such a payment system is
as follows:
 The customer sends a transaction order to buy an item from
the merchant, (e.g. a bag of rice worth $50).
 The merchant confirms the customer’s identity and forwards
the billing information to the bank, (e.g. customer A wants to
buy a bag of rice worth $50).
 If there is enough money in the customer’s account, the bank
accepts the transaction and temporarily deducts the amount
from the customer and tells the merchant to deliver the item.
(If there is not enough money, the bank rejects the transaction,
which ends there.).
 The merchant delivers the item to the customer.
 If there is no complaint from the customer, the bank deducts
the money permanently from the customer’s account, pays the
merchant, and then notifies the customer.
Such payment systems fail to function in disaster areas for
the following reasons:
 Unavailability of a network infrastructure.
 Non-availability of a bank — We will assume that a user
can access a bank at least every two days.
 Fraudulent Transactions and Impersonation.
 Security/Authentication Issues — Online authentication is
not possible in disaster areas for lack of a network infrastruc-
ture.
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C. Endorsement-Based Mobile Payment System
In order to enable transactions in disaster areas without
network infrastructures and without direct access to a bank,
this study aims to achieve mobile transaction in disaster areas
by introducing an endorsement-based mobile payment system.
Endorsement: In a payment system, endorsement is a mecha-
nism by which a user (called an endorser hereafter) agrees by
signing a form to make payment instead of a customer in the
case that the customer fails to pay a merchant. The endorser
should have real money deposited in a bank before the disaster
occurs.
With the endorsement mechanism, we can achieve a mobile
payment system in a disaster area even if the bank is not
accessible. For example, let us say that endorser E agrees to
endorse A. The procedure for A to buy an item from a merchant
using an endorsement-based payment is as follows:
Fig. 2. Transaction process in an endorsement-based payment system without
network infrastructure.
 Customer A sends a transaction order message to buy an
item from the merchant, (e.g. a bag of rice worth $50). The
transaction order message includes a transaction order form,
customer A’s temporary identity, the merchant’s identity, the
endorsers identity, the banks identity, the item number, the item
quantity, etc.
 The merchant confirms customer A’s identity (by a digitally
signed photograph, explained later), creates a billing message
(which includes billing form, merchant identity, customer tem-
porary identity, endorser identity, bank identity, order number,
total transaction value, etc.). However, since there is no direct
connection to the bank and there are no means of confirming
if Customer A has enough money in his/her account, the
merchant will request of the endorser, by forwarding the billing
and transaction messages to the endorser, that the endorser
guarantee the transaction.
 The endorser confirms the merchants identity and customer
A’s identity, creates an endorsement message (which includes
an endorsement form, customer A’s temporary identity, mer-
chant identity, endorser identity, order number, endorsement
amount, etc.), indicating that he/she agrees to guarantee the
transaction by signing the endorsement message with his/her
signature. The endorser forwards the endorsement message,
billing message and transaction order message to the merchant,
(stating for example, ”I agree to guarantee customer A’s
transaction of $50”).
(a) The merchant forwards all messages to the bank.
(b) The merchant then delivers the item to customer A. The
merchant will get paid since the transaction is endorsed by
endorser E.
 The bank confirms that the identity of all users and that all
the information provided are genuine.
(a) The bank then confirms the account balance of customer
A and deducts the transaction amount, (e.g. deducts $50).
(b) The bank pays the merchant, (e.g. adds $50 to the mer-
chants account).
(c) However, if customer A does not have enough money to
pay for the item, the money is deducted from endorser E.
With this model, we can achieve a financial transaction in
a disaster area even without a direct connection to a bank.
However, we still face the problems introduced in Section IV.
We will look at the solution for each one in turn.
IV. SCHEMES SECURING AN ENDORSEMENT-BASED
MOBILE PAYMENT SYSTEM
In this section, we introduce problems faced by our mobile
payment system and the techniques adopted to solve them and
thus enable secure transactions in endorsement-based mobile
payment systems.
A. Providing Authentication and Security
Problem (Authentication and Security) : When a cus-
tomer initiates a transaction in a normal payment system,
each customer’s authentication is checked online through the
bank, and access to the payment system is granted only if the
authentication is valid. A customer can only be impersonated
if a dishonest user is able to get the customer’s credentials. In
a disaster area, authenticating a customer is impossible since,
due to the lack of a network infrastructure, a connection to the
bank is not available.
Solution (Digitally Signed Picture) : We propose the
following offline mechanism for authenticating each user.
TABLE I. PROPOSED SYSTEM KEYS













First, customer and merchant register with the bank and
exchange IDs before a disaster occurs. The registration is done
off-line beforehand. Second, the bank serves as the certificate
authority and issues digital certificates to all users. Users’
private keys, as shown in Table I, are used to authenticate
users in the system.
In addition, the customer selects a photograph that will
be digitally signed by the bank. This serves as an additional
authentication means during a transaction; this protects the
other party in case of a stolen phone. (This is the same
as checking an individual photograph on an identity card,
though here the merchant will also confirm the banks and the
customer’s digital signatures on the photograph.) The system
can also use some other method of biometric authentication.
In order to ensure the security of the transactions in the
system, all messages are digitally signed and encrypted. This
will prevent repudiation of transactions. Also, other users can
monitor each transaction and thereby identify a dishonest user
in the network
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B. Preventing Customer and Endorser Colluding
Problem (Customer and Endorser Colluding) : In our
mobile payment system (in Section III-C), endorsers guarantee
to pay a merchant on behalf of their customer. However, it is
possible for endorsers and a customer to collude to defraud
the payment system. For example, dishonest endorsers may
endorse a dishonest customer, both without money in their
accounts. There is no way to confirm their account balances
during a transaction in a disaster area. Furthermore, due to
some delay in receiving messages, it is possible for the cus-
tomer or the endorsers to withdraw money from their accounts
before the bank moves to deduct money for the purchase.
Hence, a mechanism is needed to confirm the customer account
balance during the transaction.
Remark 1: There are only three parties that might collude:
Customer, Endorser and Merchant. And the maximum number
in collusion considered here is two (e.g. customer and en-
dorsers), though there are other conceivable combinations of
colluding: customer and monitor, endorsers and monitor etc.).
Other Combinations of Colluding : The following com-
binations in colluding are also possible in the system.
 Two Customers Colluding (A customer and another
customer): one customer pretends to endorse another.
 Two Endorsers Colluding : This is possible only if one
of the endorsers pretends to be a customer (i.e., is able to
forge customer information and collude with another endorser
to endorse the transaction).
 Two Monitors Colluding: Similar to the case of endorsers,
two monitors can collude only if one of the monitors acts as
a customer while the other endorses the transaction.
 Two Merchants Colluding: Two merchants may want to
collude to defraud customer or endorsers; however, this is not
possible without knowing both the customers and the endorsers
information (i.e., the customers and the endorsers private keys,
real IDs, etc.).
Preventing other possible combinations of colluding is
described in Section IV-G.
Solution (E-coin Balance Checking): To prevent collud-
ing, we employ the e-coin technique to check the bank balance
of endorsers. In order to buy an e-coin, some money has to
be deposited. The e-coin not only prevents colluding, it also
prevents a customer from carrying out multiple transactions
after turning off their phone, when there is no way to confirm
their account balance. (We assume that most users will not
turn off their phone after they have contacted the bank).
E-coin : The bank creates for an endorser unique e-coins,
similar to tokens, as in [12], [13]: eT1 , eT2 , eT3 ,. eTn , for
example. The sum of these e-coins will be equal to the account
balance of the endorser. As shown in Figure 3, the e-coin
contains the endorser’s identity, e-coin identifier (signed with
the bank digital signature), e-coin value, GPS coordinates (with
GPS coordinates of the bank as default values) and two blank
fields (for function extension). An example of an e - coin is
given in Figure 4.
When endorsing a transaction, an endorser attaches to an
endorsement message an e-coin equivalent to the endorsed
amount of that transaction. (The e-coin is part of the endorse-
ment message and every endorsement message is signed by
the endorser.)
Fig. 3. Format of an e-coin created by the bank.
Fig. 4. An example of an e-coin used on a transaction.
Fig. 5. An example of an endorsement message.
If the endorsed customer does not default in payment,
the bank can reissue the e-coin. Otherwise, the corresponding
amount of deposited money will be paid. Therefore, colluding
by the customer and the endorser can be prevented by check-
ing whether there is an e-coin attached to the endorsement
message.
In a situation where an e-coin is lost or corrupted while
being transmitted to an endorser, the endorser will have less
e-coin than the money in their account. To avoid this, the bank
sets a pre-determined expiration date on the e-coin. The e-
coin will be invalidated after the predetermined date, if the
bank has not received a report from the endorser that the e-
coin was received. The bank can then issue a new e-coin to
replace the one that was lost or corrupted. When an e-coin is
not used and the expiration date passes, the e-coin becomes
invalid and cannot be accepted by a merchant. A monitor can
confirm whether or not the e-coin has expired by checking the
expiration date on the e-coin before the transaction begins. To
replace an expired e-coin, the bank issues a new e-coin for the
user.
C. Preventing Double Spending
Problem (Preventing Double Spending of an E-coin) :
An endorser could possibly try to spend the same e-coin twice
for two different transactions, (double spending is using e-
currency more than once to pay the same or different people).
Solution (Event Chains) : To prevent double spending
in the system and also ensure that the e-coin is secure, the
proposed method allows the merchant to check the log for all
events in the past associated with the endorser. To do this, an
endorser requests other monitoring nodes to sign (with their
digital signature) their transaction logs each time a new event
occurs. This will, however, require a lot of communication
overhead, since the monitoring node will need to go through
the customer’s entire transaction log before signing.
Therefore, we propose an event chain as a solution to
double spending. An event chain is a successive application of
a cryptographic hash function on a piece of an event log (called
a block). Instead of sending and signing on the entire log, the
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endorser calculates the hash value in the last block, which is
effectively the hash value of the entire log, and sends it to the
monitor. The monitor signs on the combination of hash value,
GPS coordinates, timestamp, and a new event (e.g. spending an
e-coin); the monitor then sends the block back to the endorser.
In this way, all past events of the endorser are recorded to
form an event chain, which can be verified by any user. An
endorser exchanges a hello message with neighboring monitor
nodes periodically to add a new event to the event chain. If a
predetermined length of time passes since the last event before
a new event is added to the event chain, the event chain is
invalidated and can no longer be used. In order to ensure that
the e-coin has not been double-spent, the user receives and
checks the event log which is the entire event chain, from the
point at which the e-coin was received by the endorser.
Each user retains the event chain as their transaction log.
When a new event is created, a new block is concatenated to
the previous event chain as shown in Figure 6. The preceding
block and the entire log of the present transaction event are
signed and sent to the monitor. To verify other information in
a block, a user requests the entire log.
Fig. 6. Event Chain.
When an endorser receives a new e-coin from the bank,
the e-coin is received either directly from the bank or relayed
to the endorser through the users available within the radio
range, as shown in Figure 7. We assume that the bank can
be trusted. In the case that an e-coin is delivered through the
MANET, the last two users to relay the e-coin to the endorser
will compute the hash value of the e-coin identifier and the
timestamp combined, and then add this value to the e-coin
before signing it with his/her digital signature.
Fig. 7. Receiving a new E-coin.
Remark 2: The reason we use e-coins only for endorsement
is to allow customers to make new transactions immediately
after turning off the phone: turning off the phone invalidates
the event chain. Our system allows the user to make a new
transaction after turning on the phone before he/she commu-
nicates with the bank, since the transaction is guaranteed by
his/her endorsers. The endorser cannot endorse a transaction
immediately after turning the phone off and on. But since
we assume that there are many endorsers available, the
transaction can be guaranteed by other endorsers.
D. Preventing Collusion among stolen Phones
Problem (Confirming Transaction Location Source) : It
may happen that an attacker steals the phone of a customer
or endorser and tries to do a transaction with the phone in
another location. If many phones are stolen by an attacker,
collusion among those phones is possible. Also, customers or
endorsers may do a transaction in a location other than their
usual locations and then deny having made such a transaction.
Thus, to ensure transaction integrity, the transaction location
needs to be confirmed.
Solution (Location Information Based Monitoring) :
We propose a location information-based monitoring scheme
to achieve confirmation of transaction location. According to
this scheme, each endorser will constantly exchange HELLO
messages with monitor nodes to show that the endorser is in
a particular location at a particular time. A HELLO message
contains a tag with the coordinates obtained from the GPS
of the endorser’s phone; and the same event chain block is
appended to the end of each HELLO message each time a
new event is created. Other users of the system can monitor
the endorser’s transaction location by checking an endorser’s
entire log of the event chain (or the log since the e-coin was
received) and compare it with the event chain at the end of the
previous HELLO message exchanged by the endorser. Also,
the interval between the HELLO messages is added to one
of the blank fields of the e-coin, as shown in Figure 8. The
HELLO message intervals in the e-coin can also be compared
with the interval in the HELLO message. If an endorser fails to
exchange HELLO messages with other users for several time
intervals, this would indicate that the endorser is no longer
within the range or there is connectivity loss.
Phones that share similar location histories cannot be used
in a transaction.
Fig. 8. Example of location information based monitoring.
E. Preventing Reset and Recovery Attack
Problem (Reset and Recovery Attack) : In a reset
and recovery attack, a user backs up all transaction data (a
transaction order message or an endorsement message) already
used to buy an item and then resets his/her phone to the
default state. Then he/she recovers all valid transaction data
and maliciously or fraudulently uses the same data to buy items
1. Consider a scenario where a dishonest customer buys an
item from merchants M1 and M2, then resets the phone to the
default settings. Then the customer recovers the backup data
and uses the same data to buy an item from some merchant
other than merchantsM1 andM2. We can say that the user has
successfully carried out a reset and recovery attack. Although
it is possible to detect this if the user is spending money in
his/her account when there is a direct connection to the bank,
in an infrastructureless environment like a disaster area, this is
not possible. Therefore, we need to prevent already endorsed
transactions to be used twice by a user (customer or endorser)
while maintaining his/her anonymity.
1This is also a form of replay attack, where an adversary intercepts the data
and retransmits it later.
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Solution (Blind Signature and Event Chain): To pre-
vent a user (customer or endorser) from carrying out many
transactions with the same transaction order message (already
endorsed) for reset and recovery attacks, we propose the
schemes described below that employ techniques of an event
chain (to prevent users from reusing the same message) and
techniques of the blind signature (to ensure anonymity).
Blind signature : The blind signature technique allows
a person to get a message signed by another party without
revealing any information about the message to that party. In
traditional transactions, people have used blind signatures by
enclosing a message in a special envelope lined with carbon
paper. The outside of the envelope is signed and the carbon
allows the signature to show on the message without exposing
the content in the envelope. In [14], a method is proposed to
do this using cryptography. We use this method in our system.
Fig. 9. Preventing reset and recovery attack from a customer.
Preventing attack from a customer : The scheme is illus-
trated in Figure 9.
 Customer A creates a transaction order message and blinds
the transaction message using a blind signature, then computes
the hash value of the last event chain block, and appends it to
the message. Customer A then broadcasts the message.
 Monitor J accepts the message and signs a combination of
hash values, GPS coordinates, the timestamp and a new event,
and appends these to the message. Monitor J then sends them
to customer A.
 Customer A unblinds the transaction order message, and
forwards the signed transaction order message to the merchant.
 The merchant checks the validity of the event chain. If the
event chain is valid, the merchant proceeds by forwarding the
messages (transaction message and billing message) to the
endorsers. If the event chain is invalid, the transaction order
message is seen to be forged or already used in the previous
transaction, and the merchant will reject the transaction.
Thus, if a user (e.g., customer or endorser) attempts to use
the same transaction order message or endorsement message
with another merchant, after resetting his/her phone, the user
will have to change the event chain of all previous transac-
tions to modify the hash values, GPS coordinates and the
timestamp in the previous transaction. The user cannot modify
the previous transaction message without changing the hash
values. (Monitor J also signed the message with his/her digital
signature.). By checking the entire event chain to see if the
predefined time had passed before a new event was added, the
merchant will detect that the message has already been used.
Preventing attack from an endorser: We adopt the scheme
illustrated in Figure 9 and the transaction process described
above to prevent reset attack from an endorser.
The monitor checks if the e-coin has been double spent
before signing a combination of hash values, GPS coordinates,
the timestamp and a new event. Also, the monitor checks for
the validity of the event chain of the HELLO message.
F. Transaction based on Chains of Endorsement
Problem (Availability of Endorsers) : Given a situation
where an endorser is not available, the transaction will be
delayed, and the merchant will not accept the transaction order
as valid.
Solution (Chains of Endorsers): To avoid the lack of en-
dorsers, we propose chains of endorsers, where each customer
has as many endorsers as possible. When an endorser is not
available to endorse a transaction, others will be able to. The
more endorsers a transaction has, the more secure it is. When a
customer buys an item but defaults afterwards, instead of one
endorser bearing the liability, which may reduce the money
for endorsing another customer, the liability for that item is
shared among all the endorsers by introducing many endorsers.
To encourage endorsers to stay honest and support the mobile
payment system, some part of the transaction amount (e.g.,
3%) is awarded to endorsers.
If the number of endorsers available does not suffice to
cover the transaction amount, or the customer does not know
enough people to endorse him, this will lead to a shortage of
money to pay the merchant. This can be detected by checking
the e-coin attached to every endorsement message, but it will
lead to the merchant declining the endorsement message every
time the e-coin is less than the transaction amount. To avoid
this and to ensure that the customer can buy an item even when
some of the endorsers are not available or when the endorsers’
money is insufficient, we introduce chains of endorsement.
According to this method, endorsers have their own endorsers
that can inherit transactions to be endorsed.
During registration, after the customer has selected en-
dorsers, the bank creates an endorsement-chains tree, in which
all the direct endorsers of a customer form the first level of the
endorsement chain. The tree is updated as endorsers select their
own endorsers. Each customer will have levels of endorsers,
as shown in Figure 10, depending on the number of endorsers
they have as their primary endorsers.
Fig. 10. Customer endorsement tree.
Consider a scenario, in which a customer sends a trans-
action order to a merchant to buy an item for $4,000. The
merchant will create a billing message and forward it to the
endorsers. The endorsers create an endorsement message and
attach e-coins equivalent to the registered endorsement amount.
However, due to disruption of the network, one of the endorsers
is not available, as shown in Figure 11.
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Fig. 11. Chains of Endorsement during Transaction
The merchant, after receiving the endorsement message
from endorsers, checks whether the value of the e-coins is less
than the transaction amount. If the value of the e-coins exceeds
the transaction amount, the merchant proceeds to forward all
the information to the bank. However, if the e-coins value
is less than the transaction amount, the merchant obtains the
information of level-two endorsers from the endorsement tree
header. The endorsement tree header is the one who provides
information on how the merchant can access the secondary
endorsers. The endorsement tree header is included in the
customer transaction message and contains the information of
the customers secondary endorsers up to level 5.
Then the merchant can search for level-two endorsers of
the customer (who are the endorsers of the unavailable level 1
endorsers). The merchant forwards the billing information to
the level-two endorsers, as shown in Figure 12. The process is
repeated until the e-coin value equals or exceeds the transaction
amount. If no secondary endorser is available in these cases,
the merchant can reject the transaction.
Fig. 12. Chains of endorsement during transaction.
Problem (Forged Endorsement Tree Header) : The
endorsement tree header can be forged by an attacker or a
dishonest user to deceive secondary endorsers into endorsing
transactions that do not originate directly from the legitimate
customer (in this example, the customer of the first level
endorser).
Solution (Preventing Forged Endorsement Tree Header)
: As a proof that the endorsement tree header is not forged,
each endorser, each time they endorse a customer, updates
their information on the endorsement tree header by calculating
the hash value of the customer ID of the last customer they
endorsed.
Before endorsing a customer, each secondary endorser, by
calculating the hash value of the customer ID, confirms if this
hash value in the endorsement header matches the one received
from the merchant.
If the hash value is the same, the secondary endorser can
then endorse the customer; otherwise the endorsement request
from the merchant is rejected.
G. Preventing Other Combinations of Colluding
Other combinations of colluding are also prevented in the
system.
Colluding with the Monitor : Customer, endorsers or Mer-
chant may want to collude with the monitor, but this is difficult
without knowing the monitor before the transaction is carried
out. Colluding with the monitor is possible only given a small
number of users in the system. To prevent customer, endorsers
or merchant from colluding with the monitor, the proposed
protocol will ensure that customer, endorsers and merchant
will be unable to predict the monitor that will check their
transaction for validity before signing the transaction.
Colluding with the Merchant : Endorsers cannot collude with
the merchant without a customer. And it is impossible for an
endorser or for other users to forge the digital signature of a
customer, which is used on every transaction.
H. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about the mobile
payment system.
Assumption 1 : Most of the users in the system are
trustworthy users who do not change location often; this will
make it easy to prevent fraudulent transactions. Most of the
users do not power off the phone very often.
Assumption 2 : All users are in the disaster area except the
bank. Users in a disaster area communicate using a mobile ad-
hoc network while the bank uses a wireless or wired network
to communicate. Also, it takes at least two days for a message
to get to the bank.
Assumption 3 : No more than two parties will collude to
commit fraud in the system.
Assumption 4 : A sufficient number of monitoring nodes
is available most of the time.
The overall procedures of our proposed endorsement-based
mobile payment system are summarized as follows.
 Customer A creates a transaction order message and blinds
the transaction order message using a blind signature; then
computes the hash value of the last event chain block and
appends it to the message; then broadcasts the message.
 Monitor J accepts the message and signs a combination of
hash values, GPS coordinates, the timestamp and a new event;
appends it to the message; then sends it to customer A.
 Customer A unblinds the transaction order message and
forwards the signed transaction order message to the merchant.
 Merchant M checks the validity of the event chain. If the
event chain is valid, the merchant proceeds to forward the
transaction message and the billing message to the endorsers.
An invalid event chain indicates that the transaction order mes-
sage is forged or was already used in a previous transaction,
and the merchant will reject the transaction.
 Endorser E creates an endorsement message and blinds it
using a blind signature scheme; then computes the hash value
of the last event chain block and appends to the message the
hash value and an e-coin equivalent to endorsement amount;
then broadcasts the message.
 Monitor D accepts the message and checks if the e-coin is
not double spent; checks for the validity of the event chain
(and the event chain of the HELLO message); then signs a
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combination of hash values, GPS coordinates, the timestamp
and a new event, and appends it to the message; then sends it
to Endorser E.
 Endorser E unblinds the endorsement message and forwards
the signed endorsement message with an e-coin to the mer-
chant.
 MerchantM receives the endorsement message from endorser
E; checks the validity of the event chain and checks whether
the e-coin is not double spent; sends the transaction, billing
and endorsement forms to bank B if the event chain is valid
and if the e-coin has not been double spent. If either the event
chain is invalid or the e-coin has been double spent, merchant
M will reject the transaction.
 Merchant M sends a transaction confirmation to customer A
and to endorser E and supplies the item to customer A.
 Bank B authenticates the identities of merchant M, endorser
E and customer A; then checks for the validity of the event
chain. If customer A has sufficient funds in his/her account,
bank B deducts the transaction amount from customer A and
pays merchant M. Bank B sends an acknowledgment message
to merchant M, endorser E and customer A. If customer A
does not have sufficient money, bank B deducts the transaction
amount from endorser E.
V. EVALUATION
The following goals can be achieved by a mobile payment
system in a disaster area after our proposed system is run
successfully.
 Feasibility: Our proposed mobile payment system overcomes
such limitations of mobile transaction in a disaster area as un-
availability of a network, need of account balance verification,
danger of reset and recovery attacks, etc.
 Authentication: In our system, the bank serves as a certifi-
cate authority and issues digital certificates to all users; and
users can authenticate each other without a network connection
with a third party. A customer authenticates a merchant using
the digital certificates issued by the bank, while a merchant
can use both the digital certificates and the digitally-signed
photograph to authenticate a customer.
 Anonymity: When broadcasting transaction messages, users
do not reveal the content of a message because the blind
signature scheme is used. Furthermore, a customer can use a
nickname instead of a real name in each transaction. Since
customer and merchant physically meet and agree to do a
transaction, it is always possible to take a photograph. Using
a digitally signed photograph, therefore, does not compromise
anonymity. In addition, our proposed system can use biometric
methods of authentication .
 Confidentiality: All messages in the network are encrypted
and digitally signed by users. If customer A sends a message
to merchant M, the message will be encrypted with merchant
M’s public key and digitally signed with customer A’s private
key. Any other user in the system will not be able to decrypt
a message unless they have merchant M’s private key.
 Integrity: To ensure that messages are not modified while in
transit or cannot be repudiated later, a blind digital signature
scheme and an event chain scheme are used. Forms such as
a transaction order form, a billing form and an endorsement
form are also digitally signed.
 Reliability: To ensure consistency in transaction information
and to avoid user impersonation in a situation where phones
may be stolen, location information-based monitoring is used.
Each user’s GPS coordinates are attached to the transaction
message to prove that the users are in their claimed location.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new mobile payment sys-
tem which adopts infrastructureless mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs) to allow users to purchase necessities in a disaster
area. Based on the endorsement mechanism, endorsers provide
payment guarantees for each transaction between customers
and merchants, thereby enabling mobile transactions in disaster
areas even without immediate access to a bank. Moreover,
by employing techniques of blind signature, event chain and
location information-based monitoring, the proposed mobile
payment system promises also to provide secure transactions,
preventing, for example, fraud, collusion, reset and recovery
attacks, impersonation of users and double spending.
There is at present no reason to suppose that our proposed
method is not scalable, and, as a future work, its scalability
will be evaluated using simulation.
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